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THE RENVOI THEORY AND THE APPLICA-
TION OF FOREIGN LAW. 
• 
II. Renvoi IN PARTICULAR Cr,ASSES OF CASES. 
It has been intimated that renvoi might be allowed as an ex-
ceptional doctrine with respect to the lex domicilii. The theory 
suggested is that since the adoption of the le.~ domicilii in the Con-
flict of Laws arose from a desire that the rights governed thereby 
be subject to one law1-an aim impossible of realization after many 
countries have gone over to the lex patria?-_courts still adhering 
to the old rule would be justified in interpreting the same in a 
renvoi sense.2 This conclusion, however, is inadmissible. Could 
the question be examined de novo, English and American 
courts, for example, might hold, in view of their tendency 
to subject transfers of personal property inter vivos to the 
lex rei sit(E, 3 that the same rule should govern its distribution 
upon death. But as long as the lex domicilii is retained as the 
general principle4 a substitution of the lex fori for the foreign law 
upon the sole ground that the foreign country had become a con-
vert to the lex patri(E could be supported neither upon principle nor 
upon grounds of policy.5 The objections raised against renvoi in 
general apply with full force to this class of cases. 6 
'There is considerable doubt in regard to the origin of the rule lex 
domicilii in the matter of succession. See Harvey v. Richards ( 1818) 
r Mason 381, per Story, J.; Thorne v. Watkins (1750) 2 Ves. 35 (Lord 
Hardwicke); Meili, International Civil and Commercial Law 372-374; 
v. Bar, Private International Law (Gillespie's trans!.) 792-8o6. 
•see Sewell, 3 Darras 517, 524 
'Cammell v. Sewell (r86o) 5 Hurl. & N. 728; Green v. Van Buskirk 
(1866) 5 Wall. 307; (1868) 7 Wall. 139; Lees v. Harding Whitman & Co. 
(1905) 68 N. J. Eq. 622; Schmidt v. Perkins (1907) 74 N. J. Law 785. 
•It is evident that countries like England and the United States, in 
which there is no uniform law of succession, cannot, as long as such 
condition lasts, adopt the lex patriae intra-territorially. 
•Professor Meili, of the University of Zurich, has suggested that 
renvoi might be adopted in the above class of cases by countries still 
adhering to the lex domicilii as a legislative measure of retorsion with a 
view of checking the encroachments of the lex patriae. (Das internationale 
Privatrecht 1md die Staatenkonferenzen im Haag, 30-31). It is difficult 
to see, however, even if the propriety of retorsion in the Conflict of Laws 
were conceded, how it would, in this instance, accomplish any beneficial 
result. The doctrine of renvoi would, in' fact, lead to the enforcement of 
the lex patriae when, without such a doctrine, the lex fori would have 
prescribed the application of the lex domicilii. 
"Westlake advocated renvoi before the Institute of International Law at 
its session at the Hague with respect to the above class of cases only. 
17 Ammaire 31, 217-219. Although the lex domicilii differs from the 
other rules of the ·Conflict of Laws in that it is based upon the personal 
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Article 27 of the Law of Introduction to the German Civil 
Code, which went into effect on January I, I900, provides for the 
application of German law whenever in matters relating to capacity, 
marriage, matrimonial property, divorce, and succession, the for-
eign law refers back to German law. According to Article 28 of 
the same law, Article 27 is inapplicable to property situated in a 
third State where different rules prevail. 
Ren-voi has thus been expressly sanctioned by the German legis-
lator with respect to all matters based upon the principle of nation-
ality, in so far as they have been regulated in the Code, provided 
the foreign law refers back to German law.7 The reasons for the 
final adoption of renvoi in the form contained in the above articles 
are enveloped in doubt and obscurity. In the preliminary draft, in 
which substantially the same provisions are found (section 3 I), 
the following is stated : 
"The draft starts with the principle that foreign law is applied 
in Germany not for the reason and to the extent that it wants to 
be applied, but for the reason and to the extent that its application 
corresponds to the spirit of our own law. The present section by 
way of exception takes account of the wishes of the foreign law in 
so far as the latter does not care to be applied in cases, properly 
subject to such foreign law by reason of the principle of nation-
ality, if according to the principles of Private International Law 
adopted by it, German law and not its own law is to be applied. 
This provision is to be recommended on the one hand because it 
diminishes conflicts with the lex domicilii, and on the other hand 
because, without violating the aforesaid principle, it assigns to 
German law a wider sphere of operation, which will promote the 
security of legal intercourse at home." 8 
tie existing between a country and all persons domiciled therein not-
withstanding their absence from its territory at the time of the creation 
of the right or rights in question, it is apprehended that no distinction can 
be drawn between them with regard to the question of renvoi. Upon 
further reflection Westlake abandoned his former position in favor of the 
general application of renvoi. r8 Amzuaire 35-40. 
7
.Whether or not Article 27 should be regarded as containing a general 
principle applicable also to those branches of the law not resting upon 
the le.x patri(l! and to include TVeiterverweiszmg is a mooted question 
among the German jurists and has not been definitely determined by the 
German courts. It is contended by some that the actual provisions of the 
Code were intended merely as illustrations of a general principle. Others, 
with more reason, contend in favor of a restrictive interpretation. See 
Kahn, 45 Kritisclze Vierteljahresschrift fiir Gesetzgebwzg mzd Rechtswis-
sensclzaft 6r8; Niemeyer, Das Intenzationale Prh·atrecht des biirgerliclzen 
Gesetzbuclzs 79-86; 6 Planck, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch ro6-ro8. Compare, 
v. Bar, 8 Niemeyer r88; v. Bar, 2 Holtzendorff's Encyklopiidie der Rechts-
wisseuschaft (6th ed. by Kohler) 20; Keidel, z6 Clunet rg. 
•Kahn, 36 Ihering's Jahrbiiclzer fiir die Dogmatik 370. 
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The first commission after a thorough discussion of the prob-
lem pronounced itself against the adoption of Section 3I, or of 
renvoi in any other form. The same attitude was maintained by 
the second commission. By way of exception it allowed a quali-
fied renvoi in two cases where expediency strongly suggested its 
adoption: (I) a marriage invalid under the national law of the 
parties was nevertheless to be valid if the requisite capacity existed 
under the lex domicilii or the lex celebrationis, and sanction for 
such a marriage could be found in the national law of the parties; 
( 2) a divorce obtained in accordance with the lex domicilii of the 
husband but not in accordance with his national law was to be valid 
if upheld by his national law. For reasons so far undisclosed, the 
Federal Council struck out these provisions and adopted the prin-
ciple contained in the original draft.9 Whether or not renvoi in 
the form it has received in Article 27 became a part of German 
law as a result of political considerations, owing to the participation 
of the Foreign Office in the deliberations of the Federal Council, 
as Kahn intimates/0 the fact remains that it reflects neither the 
opinion of the Court of the Empire at the time11 nor the juristic 
sentiment of Germany as a wholeP The reasons advanced in the 
original draft are without merit. The first one, viz., that the 
adoption of renvoi will diminish conflicts is not true, as has been 
shown above. The second, viz., that from an extension of the 
lex fori greater security of law for the German people would result 
is broad enough to exclude the application of any foreign law. If 
political considerations induced the adoption of Article 27 of the 
German Code, in order to give Germany a position of vantage in 
its effort to remove conflicts by international agreement, it is still 
to be regretted from the standpoint of the science of Private In-
ternational LawP 
Article I of the Convention of The Hague relating to marriage, 
and signed by various continental countries on June !2, !902, con-
tains the following provision : 
'See I Mugdan, Die gesammten Materialen zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbttch 
fiir das deutsche Reich 261-263; 6 Planck, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch 104. 
The deliberations of the Federal Council, which appear to have been but 
summary, have not as yet been published. See Kahn, 36 Ihering's Jalzr-
biicher fiir die Dogmatik 399· 
1036 Ihering's Jahrbiiclzer fiir die Dogmatik 399· 
11See supra, p. 193. 
12See supra, p. 195, n. 24. 
13For a more extended discussion of Article 27 see, Bartin, 30 Revue de 
droit international et de legislation comparee 159-170; Niemeyer, Das inter-
nationale Privatrecht des biirgerlichen Gesetzbttchs; Planck, Biirgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (3d ed.), VI, 103-1o8. 
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"The right of contracting marriage shall be governed by the 
national law of each of the parties intending to marry, unless a pro-
vision of such law refers expressly to some other law." 14 
But for the word "expressly" no doubt could possibly be enter-
tained in regard to the meaning of this article and its attitude 
toward renvoi. As it stands it would seem clearly to allow renvoi 
in some sense. The history of this article/5 however, shows that 
it was not the intention of its authors to sanction renvoi in the 
ordinary sense. They wished merely to provide for cases that 
might arise under statutes similar to the Swiss Federal Law of 
Dec. 24, 1874, relating to marriage. Articles 25 and 54 of this 
law recognize the validity of a marriage entered into by Swiss 
subjects abroad if it complies either with Swiss law or with the 
law of the place of celebration. Though the Convention required 
for the validity of a marriage conformity with the national law of 
the parties it seemed that where a national law like that of Switzer-
~and expressly sanctioned an alternative standard for the validity 
of a marriage by its subjects abroad, a marriage conforming to 
such alternative provision should be upheld. This is not ordinary 
renvoi, which implies a conflict in the rules of Private International 
Law. Switzerland does not apply in its Conflict of Laws relating 
to marriage the lex loci in the place of the lex pa.trice; it has only 
provided by express legislation that its subjects may marry abroad 
upon complying with the local law. The reference provision of 
the above article, therefore, does not relate to the general rules 
governing the Conflict of Laws with respect to marriage under the 
national law, but merely to such exceptional express legislative 
enactments as the one contained in the Swiss law. The members 
of the commission that drafted the Convention relating to marriage, 
as stated by its chairman Renault/6 were opposed to rernroi upon 
principle and had no intention of sanctioning its general applica-
tion. Some members of the Conference may have shared Asser's 
view17 that renvoi, although indefensible upon principle, should be 
adopted in international conventions based upon the lex patrice in 
14Actes de Ia Conference de Ia Haye chargee de reglementer diverses 
matieres de droit international prive, III, p. 168. 
"For the history of this article see Actes de Ia Con{erence de Ia Haye, 
etc., I, pp. 39-41, 45-50; II, pp. 43, 47-49; III, pp. 160-161 ; 167-170. See 
also Laine, 21 Clunet 247-257; 22 Clunet 470-471; 28 Clunet 14-15; 5 Darras 
24-33; I Buzzati, Trattato di diritto intenzazionale privata secondo La Con-
venzion e dell' Aja; Il Matrimonio 105-120; Kahn, 12 Niemeyer 209-217; 
36 Ihering's Jahrbiiclzer fiir die Dogmatik 383-397. 
'"Actes de Ia Con{erence de la Haye, etc., III, p. 169. 
u32 Clunet 41-42. 
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order to extend their beneficial influence to countries still following 
the le.k domicilii, which but for such provision would not adhere to 
the Convention-a view scarcely justified by subsequent events-
but if the general sentiment of the Conference had been in favor of 
renvoi upon this ground it would no doubt have been adopted in 
some of the other Conventions agreed upon. The reference pro-
vision in Article r of the Convention relating to marriage must be 
regarded, therefore, as a special rule adopted for the purpose of 
giving marriage an additional chance of validity.18 
v. Bar has suggested a line of cases in which he says renvoi is 
indispensable to avoid unjust results.19 He puts, in substance, the 
following cases : 
(r) Two subjects of State X are married in State Y, where 
they are domiciled. The validity of the marriage is questioned in 
State Z on the ground that the parties had no capacity to enter the 
marriage under the provisions of the laws of Y relating to mar-
riage, though it is conceded that they possessed such capacity 
under their national law with respect to marriage. The laws of X 
and Y agree that the le.k patria; shall govern the essentials of a 
marriage. The law of Z, on the other hand, applies the lex domi-
cilii. Should the courts of Z regard the marriage as valid? 
(2) A, a citizen of State X, dies domiciled in State Y. The 
laws of X andY agree that B is entitled to A's personal estate in 
accordance with A's national law. Subsequently B's heirship is 
contested in State Z, in which State the lex domicilii is held to gov-
ern the distribution of personal property upon death. Should B's 
title be recognized by the courts of Z? 
v. Bar would answer both questions in the affirmative upon 
principles of renvoi. He formulated the rule applicable to the above 
cases in the following thesis which he submitted to the Institute of 
International Law: 
A court must respect : "The decision of two or more foreign 
legislations, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily 
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a ques-
tion to the same legislation." 20 
, ... It implies a concession to the theory called 'renvoi.' But, aside from 
the fact that concessions may be legitimately made in an international 
convention to theories which scientifically one does not approve, this one 
is very slight; it is indeed beneficial since it consists in a deference on 
the part of states to the desire manifested by other states that the marriage 
of their subjects abroad shall have all possible chances of validity." Laine, 
28 Clunet 15-16. · 
'"8 Niemeyer 183-184-
20See 18 Annuaire 41. 
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A resolution of similar import was introduced before the Insti-
tute of International Law by an opponent of renvoi, Professor Streit 
of the University of Athens.21 In view of the observation, however, 
that this resolution involved in fact a proposition quite distinct 
from renvoi, to wit, what effect should be attributed to conventions 
between, or identical legislation on the part of, two countries by 
another State, it was agreed by the members of the Institute to 
make this a special topic for future consideration. 22 
It is not proposed to examine the above cases nor any other 
special class of cases to which renvoi or something akin might 
perhaps with propriety be applied.23 The sole object of this article 
is to deal with the general aspects of the question. 
III. Renvoi AS A PART OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAw. 
We are now ready to inquire to what extent, if any, renvoi has 
become an established part of the common law, and to discuss, 
first, the English decisions which lend most support to the doctrine. 
In Collier v. Ri7'GZ24 certain codicils to a will made by an Eng-
lishman whose domicile at the time of his death, in the English 
sense, was in Belgium, but, in the Belgian sense, was in England, 
were opposed in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury on the 
ground that their execution was not in the form required by 
Belgian law of Belgian subjects. Upon proof that these codicils 
would be upheld by the courts of Belgium, Sir Herbert Jenner 
admitted them to probate. The learned justice said: 
"Then according to the opinion of these gentlemen, well skilled 
in the practical application of the Code Napoleon and its disposi-
tions, and which was the law in force in Belgium up to the year 
1830, when the separation of the two countries took place, and 
consequently at the time at which these testamentary documents 
"'r8 Annuaire 164. 
""See r8 Ammaire 178. See also Kahn's observations in regard to this 
question in 45 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fiir Gesetzgebtmg 622-623. 
"Bartin has considered this question with regard to three special classes 
of cases: (r) with respect to consular jurisdictions; (2) with respect to 
countries like Switzerland, where the national legislator may have pre-
scribed in particular instances the application of the law of a particular 
canton or State; (3) with respect to countries bound by international 
conventions in the matter of Private International Law. See 30 Revue de 
Droit International et de Legislation Comparee 283-300. 
"(r84r) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855, 862, 863. Other English cases upholding 
foreign wills by interpreting the rule of Private International Law relating 
to the formal validity of wills in a renvoi sense are: Frere v. Frere (1847) 
5 Notes of Cases 593; Crookenden v. Fuller (1859) I Sw. & Tr. 441, 
obiter; In the Goods of Brown-Sequard (1894) 70 L. T. (N. s.) 8n, 
ex parte. 
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of Mr. Ryan were executed, they do not consider that Mr. Ryan, 
as a foreigner, was bound by the requisites of the law of Belgium, 
as to the form and execution of a will, as would necessarily be the 
case with a free, natural-born subject of Belgium; but the succes-
sions of persons who, however long they might have been resident, 
not having obtained the royal authority to reside there, being con-
sidered as mere foreigners, would be governed by the laws of their 
own country, and would be upheld by the Courts of Belgium, if 
those Courts were called on to decide. The Court sitting here 
decides from the evidence of persons skilled in that law, and de-
cides as it would if sitting in Belgium. 
"Therefore I am of opinion, that notwithstanding the domicile 
of Mr. Ryan must be considered to have been in Belgium, and that 
he had in point of law abandoned his original domicile, and had 
acquired animo et facto a domicile in a foreign country, yet that 
foreign country in which he was so domiciled would uphold his 
testamentary disposition, if executed according to the forms re-
quired by his own country. I am therefore of opinion, that I am 
bound to decree probate of the will and all the codicils." 
This case appears to sanction renvoi in its extreme form. 
Though under the facts of the case English law became applicable, 
logic would demand that the direction of the foreign law be fol-
lowed in all cases irrespective of the fact whether it led in the end 
to the application of the lex fori or to that of another country. 
Actually the case decides only that a will, invalid as to form under 
the English rules of Private International Law, will be admitted to 
probate in England if it conforms to the lex domicilii inclusive of 
its rules governing the Conflict of Laws. Such a decision was quite 
natural at a time when the Court of Delegates had just laid down 
the narrow and misconceived rule that a will, in the matter of 
form, must comply with the lex domicilii at the time of the testa-
tor's death.25 This rule has since been changed by the English 
Wills Act/6 which has brought the English law into harmony with 
that prevailing on the continent, so that to-day the above codicils 
would be valid under the English rules of Private International 
"'Stanley v. Bernes (1830) 3 Hagg. 447. See also Craigie v. Lewin 
(1842) 3 Curt. Ecc. 435; De Zichy Ferraris v. Hertford (1843) 3 Curt. 
Ecc. 468; affd. Croker v. Hertford (1844) 4 Moo. P. C. 339; Bremer v. 
Freeman (r857) 10 Moo. P. C. 300; Moultrie v. Hunt (1861) 23 N. Y. 
394- The English law was in a state of doubt prior to this time. It had 
been held that a will executed by an Englishman abroad might be in 
the English form. Duchess of Kingston Case, cited in 2 Add. 21; Curling 
v. Thornton (1823) 2 Add. 6. 
""1861, St. 24 & 25 Viet., c. II4 In various States of this country 
also the rule that in formal respects a will must comply with the law of 
domicile at the time of death has been changed by statute. 
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Law. These considerations detract somewhat from the authority 
of this case.27 
In In the Goods of Lacroix28 the question arose again with re-
spect to the formal validity of a will, but this time under the Eng-
lish Wills Act. The will and codicils in the case were executed in 
Paris in the English form by a born Frenchman who had subse-
quently acquired the British nationality. The testator's domicile 
at the time of the making of the will was probably in France. 
Upon the affidavit of a French advocate that the instruments would 
be held valid by the French courts, Sir J. Hannen admitted them to 
probate as valid according to the law of the place where made. 
In this case, therefore, the rule locus regit actum under the Eng-
lish Wills Act is taken to refer to the foreign law in its totality. 
But, as the application for probate was ex parte, and the real point 
in question was simply assumed, not considered, the case is not 
entitled to any weight. 
In the case of In re Trufort/ 9 a British subject by birth, who 
had acquired the Swiss nationality, died domiciled in France, leav-
ing personal property in England, Switzerland and Italy, which 
he bequeathed to defendant. Plaintiff claimed nine-tenths of the 
estate as his compulsory portion as testator's lawful son under a 
judgment rendered by the courts of Zurich in accordance with the 
Zurich law of succession. The competency of the Zurich courts 
in the matter was recognized by the terms of a treaty between 
France and Switzerland. Stirling, J., held that the judgment was 
conclusive upon the English courts. 
This case has been cited in support of the doctrine of W eiter-
verweisung.30 In reality, it stands only for the limited proposition 
submitted to the Institute of International Law, and regarded by 
its members as distinct from renvoi,-to the effect that where the 
law of the State in which a party has a domicile and the law of the 
country of which he is a subject agree that the law of one of them 
is to govern, the rights created by such law should be enforced or 
recognized in all jurisdictions in which either the lex domicilii or 
the lex patri<e is regarded as the proper rule.31 
"See also, Bate, Notes on Renvoi 109-n1; Abbott, 24 Law Quart. 
Rev. 142-144. 
·"'(1887) L. R. 2 P. D. 94· 
""(1887) L. R. 36 Ch. D. 6oo. 
30Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) 718-719; Westlake, Private Inter-
national Law (4th ed.) 38-39, 104. 
31For an explanation of the case see also Bate, Notes on Renvoi n2; 
Abbott, 24 Law Quart. Rev. 142. The conclusions reached in this case 
find support in an interesting article by Schnell, 5 Niemeyer 337-343. 
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The case of Armitage v. The Attorney-Genera/32 involved the 
validity of a divorce procured in South Dakota by a married woman 
under circumstances which would give that court no jurisdiction 
according to English law, but proved to be sufficient under the law 
of New York, the State in which the husband was domiciled. It 
was held that inasmuch as the courts of the State of the husband's 
domicile would recognize the decree in this instance, the divorce 
should be deemed valid in England, notwithstanding the English 
rule that the courts of the State in which the husband has his 
domicile shall be regarded as having exclusive jurisdiction for 
divorce. 
The doctrine of this case again, if supportable at all, may prop-
erly be regarded as limited to cases of marriage or divorce and as 
applicable to them only where, as the result of such application, 
the marriage or divorce will be sustained. It will be remembered 
that the second commission for the preparation of the German 
Civil Code, which rejected renvoi in general, sanctioned it upon 
grounds of expediency in the cases and for the purpose just men-
tioned. 
The first English case in which the question of renvoi was 
actually considered was that of In re Johnson. 33 The facts, in 
brief, were as follows: Mary Johnson, a British subject, whose 
domicile of origin was Malta, died domiciled in the Grand-Duchy 
of Baden, Germany, leaving personal property in Baden and in Eng-
land. The litigation related to the distribution of the movable 
property left in England which was undisposed of by will. It 
was proved that under the Baden law, the law of the country of 
which the deceased was a subject at the time of her death, would 
govern.3 -1 Farwell, !., held that the statute of distributions (!f 
Malta, that is, of the domicile of origin, should govern, basing his 
conclusion upon two distinct lines of argument. The principal 
argument advanced was that Mary Johnson had not acquired a 
domicile in Baden, inasmuch as the Baden law attributed no effect 
to domicile, the learned court saying: 
""[rgo6] P. I35· 
33 [1903] I Ch. 82I, 827-8. 
"'In this case, therefore, the issue of renvoi was squarely raised with 
respect to cases in which the lex domicilii comes into conflict with the 
lex patriae. Abbott, in 24 Law Quart. Rev. I4D-I45, gives too restricted a 
meaning to renvoi when he considers cases in which there has been a 
reascertainment of domicile with reference to the foreign law as the 
only instance of true renvoi. The question of renvoi, as generally under-
stood, is involved whenever the rules of Private International Law of the 
countries concerned differ. 
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"In order to establish a new domicile of choice, the Court has 
to be satisfied that it has been adopted animo et facto-it is essen-
tial that there should be both animus and factum. Vlhen, there-
fore, the law of the land said to be chosen as the new domicile 
disregards domicile and declines to distribute in accordance there-
with or to treat it as of any force, there cannot have been any 
change of domicile de facto; and the case is accordingly remitted 
to this Court as a case where the propositus has intended but has 
failed to obtain any effectual domicile of choice. No change is 
effectual unless the factum is proved, and the factum cannot exist 
in a country where the law refuses to recognize it. The result is 
that this Court must conclude that a domicile of choice, ineffectual 
to create any rights and liabilities governing the distribution of 
movables in the country supposed to have been chosen, is for this 
purpose no domicile at all, and that the propositus, therefore, is 
left with his domicile of origin unaffected. The Baden Courts 
would in effect have disavowed him and disclaimed jurisdiction." 
In answer to this argument it is sufficient to remark that it 
disregards the prevailing rule, which is, that the question of domi-
cile,-a mixed question of law and fact,-is to be determined in 
accordance with the law of the State in which the property affected 
is situated.35 Moreover, the court's assumption that the courts of 
Baden would have declined jurisdiction is erroneous in fact. Under 
Sections 13 and 27 of the German Code of Civil Procedure juris-
diction on the part of the Baden courts exists in matters of suc-
cession where the deceased was a resident of Baden at the time of 
his death. 
The second line of reasoning, in the words of Justice Farwell, 
was as follows : 
"The Baden Courts would have really refused jurisdiction; but, 
even if this were not so, I should arrive at the same conclusion in 
a different way. \i\fhen it is said that the Baden Courts regard the 
nationality of the propositus, I apprehend that this means that they 
distribute according to the law of the nation to which the propositus 
belongs, or in other '.Vords, of which he is a subject. But the 
British Empire is composed of a large number of States, countries, 
and colonies * * * [with] many different systems of law within 
its bounds. There is no one uniform law of this Empire which can 
be taken for this purpose as the law of the nationality of the 
propositus. To what nationality, then, does the propositus belong, 
or of whom is he a subject? The only possible answer appears to 
me to be that he is a subject of the British Crown, and that his 
""Collier v. Rivaz ( r84r) z Curt. Ecc. 855; Anderson v. Laneuville 
(r854) 9 Moo. P. C. 325; Bremer v. Freeman (1857) ro Moo. P. C. 3o6; 
Hamilton v. Dallas (r875) L. R. r Ch. D. 257; In re Martin [1900] P. 
(C. A.) 227, Lindley; Harral v. Harral (1884) 39 N. J. Eq. 279. But 
see In re Bowes (r9o6) 22 T. L. R. 7II. 
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nationality is the British Empire; but inasmuch as there is no one 
law of the Empire to which the rule in question can refer, resort 
must be had to the law of England. * * * Foreign States are in 
diplomatic relation with this country as representing the whole 
Empire. They know nothing officially of Scotland or Canada, or 
the Colonies, still less, perhaps, of the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man. * * * The only possible solution appears to me to be 
that foreign Courts must necessarily refer such questions as these 
to and decide them according to the law of the country with which 
alone they are in diplomatic relation; and inasmuch as the law of 
England distributes such movables in accordance with domicile 
of origin substantial justice is done to all His Majesty's subjects. 
* * * I conclude, therefore, that distribution according to the law 
of the nationality means according to English law, but according 
to that law as applicable to the particular propositus, and not to 
Englishmen generally without regard to their domicile of origin."36 
In this second line of reasoning the learned court, like the Pre-
rogative Court in Collier v. Rivaz, evidently intended to arrive at 
the conclusion which the Baden courts would have reached had 
the case been presented to them for adjudication, but no such 
course was actually pursued. Courts that have adopted the prin-
ciple of nationality in their Private International Law are, of 
course, confronted with a difficulty when the party in question is a 
citizen or subject of a country which has no uniform legislation on 
the point in issue, as is usually the case with respect to Great 
Britain and the United States. The difficulty has been solved by 
them by the application of the law of that portion of the country 
in which the party concerned had his last abode.37 Under the facts 
of this case the law of Malta would have become applicable. But 
if the learned court deemed it its duty to decide the question as if 
it were sitting in Baden, it should have inquired whether renvoi 
was a part of the Baden law, for the courts of Baden would be 
justified in distributing the property in accordance with the Maltese 
statute of distributions only in the event that they understood their 
lex patrifE to refer merely to the internal law of !he foreign country. 
But if they understood their rules governing the Conflict of Laws 
as referring to foreign law in its totality, and finding that the 
Maltese rule of Private International Law on the point in question 
(lex domicilii) called for the application of the law of Baden, they 
would have followed such reference and distributed the property 
""[1903] I Ch. 821, 832-83S-
37Trib. Civ. Pau, Apr. 19, rgor (29 Clunet 858) ; Trib. Civ. Seine, March 
II, 1904 (34 Clunet 434) ; App. Paris, Aug. r, 1905 (D. rgo6, 2, r6g) ; 
OLG Karlsruhe, Oct. 23, 1897 and RG Apr. 19, r8g8 (9 Niemeyer 134). 
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in accordance with the provisions of their own law.38 The state-
ment, moreover, that the English law would distribute such mova-
bles in accordance with the law of the domicile of origin is in-
correct. The lex domicilii at the time of death is the clearly 
established law in this regard. Upon the false assumption that no 
domicile had been acquired in Baden the domicile of origin would 
have remained, of course, unchanged in this particular case. But 
if the deceased had established a domicile in another part of the 
British Empire or in a foreign country before going to Baden, the 
result reached by application of the law of domicile of origin 
would not have been identical with that of the Baden courts, under 
the renvoi theory or in the absence of such theory, had the case 
come before them for decision. 
In view of the erroneous and confused reasoning of the case 
and its disregard for established rules of English law, In re John-
son lends little, if any, support to renvoi. 
Renvoi came before Mr. Justice Farwell in another case, In re 
Ba-ines, decided March 13, 1903· The case is unreported, but Dicey 
gives the following statement of it: 
"A British subject probably, but not certainly, domiciled in 
England, was possessed of land in Egypt. He died leaving a will 
valid in form according to the law both of England and of Egypt. 
His Egyptian land was sold by his executors. The proceeds 
(£r6,ooo) were lodged in a bank in England. The dispositions of 
the deceased's will were valid according to the law of England, but 
invalid according to the local or territorial law of Egypt. It was 
admitted on all hands that the right of succession to the £r6,ooo 
depended upon the right to succession to the Egyptian land. But 
succession to land is under the Egyptian Code Civil, Arts. 77, 78 
'governed by the law of the nation to which the deceased belongs.' 
The meaning of the article was disputed. The evidence of experts 
was taken : it was by this means proved that the Egyptian courts 
would hold that in the circumstances of the case succession to the 
deceased must, under the articles of the Egyptian Code, be gov-
erned by the ordinary territorial law of England. The will was 
held valid.''39 
It is apparent from the above statement of the case that the 
Egyptian law, applicable as the lex rei sita!, was referred to in its 
totality by the English law. 
"'The law of Baden at the time was adverse to renvoi. OLG Karlsruhe, 
Oct. 23, 1897 (9 Niemeyer 134). See also Kahn, 30 Ihering's Jahrbucher 
fiir die Dogmatik 12; Kahn, 36 id. 4o6. Had Mrs. Johnson died since 
January I, 1900, Art. 27 of the Law of Introduction to the German Civil 
Code would have compelled the Baden judge to make the distribution in 
accordance with the provisions of the German Code relating to succession. 
""Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) 723. 
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Advocates of renvoi, it must be admitted, find support for their 
views in the cases so far discussed. Liberally construed, the cases 
would establish renvoi as a part of the English law in the sense of 
Collier v. Rivaz, in a more radical form than that assigned to it in 
any other country either by the courts or jurists. They would seem 
to sanction Weiterverweisun;g (In re Trufort) as well as renvoi 
proper, and to require an application of this doctrine not merely 
to cases in which the le:c domicilii and the lex patri(J! are in conflict, 
but also to all other cases, whatever the rule of Private Interna-
tional Law involved in regard to which differences may exist in 
th~ countries concerned (In the Goods of Lacroix, In re Baines). 
The contention has been made40 that the law of England has 
been settled to the contrary by Bremer v. Freeman/1 decided by 
the Court of Appeal. But this view is erroneous. The question 
in that case related to the formal validity of a will, disposing of 
personal property in England, which had been executed in the 
English form in Paris by an Englishwoman, who was domiciled in 
France in the English sense but not in the French sense, for want 
of governmental authorization.42 
After having found that in accordance with the English law 
regarding domicile the testatrix had acquired a domicile in France, 
Lord W ensleydale continued : 
"This domicile being established in evidence, the burden is 
thrown on the Respondent to prove that the Will, in the English 
form, is sanctioned by the municipal law of France. He must 
show, upon the balance of the conflicting evidence in the cause, that 
the Wills of persons so domiciled, in that form, are allowed by that 
law." 
The learned justice thereupon reviewed the testimony of French 
experts regarding the meaning of Article 13 of the French Code 
and the French rules of Private International Law with respect to 
the formal validity of wills; and upon such testimony, and a per-
sonal investigation of the decisions of the French courts in regard 
to the meaning of Article 13, he concluded, (1) that Article 13 
did not deprive foreigners not so domiciled of the power to make 
a will; (2) that under the law of France the will in•the English 
form was invalid. 
That the learned court must have understood by the "munici-
pal" law of France French law in its totality and not merely its 
territorial law appears from the fact that only a rule relating to the 
40Abbott, 24 Law Quart. Rev. 143-146. 
"(1857) IO Moo. P. C. 3o6, 361. 
••see Article 13, French Civil Code. 
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Conflict of Laws could sanction a will executed in France in the 
English form. But inasmuch as the case turned principally upon 
the question of domicile and the meaning of Article 13 of the 
French Civil Code, the problem of renvoi not even being considered, 
and related, moreover, to the formal requirements of a will, in 
regard to which the English law, as a result of this decision43 has 
since been changed, no great weight can be attached to it in its 
bearing upon renvoi.44 
Opposed to the preceding cases is Hamilton v. Dallas.45 In 
this case an Englishman domiciled in France in the English sense, 
but without having obtained an authorized domicile there,46 died 
intestate with respect to a part of his estate, and the question was 
whether the next of kin should be determined in accordance with 
the French statute of distributions, or in accordance with the Eng-
lish statute. After having determined that the deceased had ac-
quired a domicile in France in the English, though not in the 
French, sense, Bacon, V. C., assumed as a matter of course that 
the French statute of distributions would govern. Had the learned 
judge regarded himself as sitting in France, the English statute 
should have been applied by virtue of the lex patrice in the French 
system of Private International Law.47 
If we look beyond the cases calling for a determination of the 
question whether the foreign law should be understood in its 
totality we find certain decisions by the House of Lords which 
may be regarded as supporting, by implication, the doctrine that 
renvoi is a part of the English law. Enolzin v. Wylie/8 as ex-
plained by Ewing v. Orr Ewing/9 established the rule that assets 
"'See Phillimore, Int. Law, IV, p. 226 . 
.. At the time of the rendering of this decision the French Court of 
Cassation recognized the optional character of the rule "locus regit actum" 
only with respect to Frenchmen executing their wills abroad. See Article 
999, Civ. Code. Cass. March 9, I853 (D. I853, I, 217). Very recently the 
optional character of the above rule has been extended to foreigners 
generally, so that they may now execute their wills in France, as far as 
form is concerned, by observing either the provisions of their national 
law or those of French law. ·Cass. Aug. II, I909 (36 Clunet I097). 
'"(I87S) L. R. I Ch. D. 257 . 
.. Article I3, French Civil Code. 
"In the absence of treaty stipulations or of an authorized domicile in 
France the French courts would be required to apply the national law of 
the deceased. But inasmuch as they have sanctioned renvoi they would 
accept a reference back to French law. Cass. June 24, I879 (I879, I, 56); 
Cass. Feb. 22, I882 ( S. I882, I, 303) ; App. Grenoble, March 3I, I9o8 
(35 Clunet 837). Contra: App. Pau, June II, I9o6 (D. I907, 2, I). 
48 (I862) IO H. L. c. I. 
"'(I883) 9 App. Cas. 34; (I885) IO App. Cas. 453· 
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left in England by a person domiciled abroad may, after the satis-
faction of local creditors, be distributed by an English judge ac-
cording to the lex domicilii, or be handed over by the court to the 
foreign representative of the estate.50 Doglioni v. Crispin51 de-
cided that when a deceased dies domiciled abroad a judgment by a 
court of the State of domicile declaring who is entitled to the per-
sonal estate will be regarded as final in England. Should the prin-
ciples laid down in these cases govern when the rules of Private 
International Law of the foreign country differ from those of the 
forum, so that the rights to the succession would not be determined 
according to the territorial law of the domicile, renvoi would have 
become an established part of the law of England in so far as it 
relates to the le.x domicilii in the law of succession. That such is 
the true import of the decisions was assumed in Re Trufort52 by 
Justice Stirling with respect to Doglioni v. Crispin. But if, as has 
been shown in the ·first part of this article, the non-application of the 
territorial law of a foreign State pointed out by the rules govern-
ing the Conflict of Laws in the forum, in compliance with the 
wishes of the foreign country, constitutes in reality a violation of 
the principles of sovereignty and of the equality of independent 
States, such an assumption would be without foundation. Instead 
of remitting the English assets to the foreign court the English 
judge should make the distribution himself according to the terri-
torial law of the country in which the deceased had his domicile. 
The decisions in Enohin v. Wylie and E·wing v. Orr Ewing rest 
upon the consideration that the courts of the domicile are in a bet-
ter position to give a correct interpretation of the le~ domicilii than 
are the courts of the forum.53 But when it appears that the lex 
domicilii, on account of different rules of Private International 
Law, would apply either the lex fori or the law of another State 
no valid reason exists for yielding to such law. By a similar pro-
cess of reasoning the application of Doglioni v. Crispin might be 
limited to cases in which the foreign court has determined the 
rights of the litigants according to its territorial law. Should such 
a restrictive interpretation, however, not be permissible in view of 
the established rules relating to foreign judgments, Doglioni v. 
""So Harvey v. Richards (I8I8) I Mason 38I; Lawrence v. Kitteridge 
(I852) 2I Conn. 577· 
"'(I866) L. R I H. L. 30I. 
""(I887) 36 Ch. D. 6oo. 
03See also Hare v. Nasmyth (I823) 2 Add. 25; De Bonneval v. De 
Bonneval (I838) I Curt. Ecc. 856; Laneuville v. Anderson (I86o) 2 Sw. 
& Tr. 24-
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Crispin would give no support to renvoi, but would disclose only 
the peculiar nature of the law governing judgments. 
It would seem, therefore, that renvoi remains unaffected by 
Enohin v. Wylie, Ewing v. On· Ewing and Doglioni v. Crispin. 
Other cases holding, ( r) that the distribution of personal prop-
erty upon death shall be according to the statute of distributions 
existing under the law of the domicile at the time of death not-
withstanding the fact that it was changed by subsequent retroactive 
legislation, valid in the State of domicile ;54 ( 2) that the domicile 
of the deceased shall be determined according to the lex rei sita? et 
fori irrespective of the law of the place of residence,S5 have been 
mentioned as opposed to renvoi.56 But they are equally inconclu-
sive. In the cases supporting the first proposition the English 
courts refused to make the distribution in the manner prescribed 
for the courts of the domicile. But even if renvoi were part of the 
common law these decisions could be sustained as exceptions to 
the rule. The rights of the next of kin having become vested at 
the time of death in accordance with the views of the lex fori, any 
attempt by the foreign legislator thereafter to divest them might be 
disregarded on grounds of public policy. The cases sustaining the 
second proposition have generally involved the peculiar provision 
of Article 13 of the Code Napoleon, which provides: "A foreigner 
authorized by decree to establish his domicile in France shall enjoy 
all civil rights." Whatever may be the effect of this article upon 
the status and rights of foreigners without an "authorized" domi-
cile, it is recognized that such foreigners may have a domicile de 
facto in France.57 The difference between Anglo-American and 
French law consists then not in an inhibition on the part of the 
French law against the establishment by foreigners of a domicile 
in the Anglo-American sense, but merely in the fact that certain 
rights granted by French law are possessed by foreigners only 
after they have acquired an "authorized" domicile. These cases, 
therefore, are not opposed to renvoi. They have no direct bearing 
upon the question. 
"'Lynch v. Provisional Gov. of Paraguay (I87I) L. R 2 P. & D. 268; 
In re Aganoor's Trusts (I89S) 64 L. J. Ch. 521. 
""Collier v. Rivaz ( I84I) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855 ; Anderson v. Laneuville 
( I854) 9 Moo. P. C. 325; Bremer v. Freeman ( I857) IO Moo. P. C. 3o6; 
Hamilton v. Dallas (I87S) L. R I Ch. D. 257; In re Martin [I900] P. 
(C. A.) 227 (Lindley); Harral v. Harral (I884) 39 N. J. Eq. 279. But 
see In re Johnson [I903] I Ch. 8zi; In re Bowes (I9o6) 22 T. L. R 7IL 
.. Abbott, 24 Law Quart. Rev. I34-I37-
•rBordeaux, Aug. I9, I879 (7 Clunet 586); App. Alger, Feb. 27, I894 
(2I Clunet 874); App. Paris, March 20, I896 (23 Clunet 402); App. Paris, 
July 9, I902 (30 Clunet I8I). 
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Can it be said in the light of the foregoing authority that renvoi 
has become an established part of the English law? Leading Eng-
lish writers have answered the question in the affirmative.58 It 
seems to the writer, however, that the actual case-law does not 
warrant such a broad and positive statement. With the exception 
of In re Baines and In the Goods of Lacroi!': the English cases 
holding that the reference was to the foreign law in its totality have 
involved only the lex domicilii. In this class of cases, as all oppo-
nents of renvoi would admit, the renvoi doctrine appears in its 
least objectionable form. No actual decision by a continental 
court nor legislative provision has extended renvoi to the lex rei 
sit({!, to the lex loci contra.ctus or to any other rule of the Conflict of 
Laws, and scarcely a jurist can be found who would give it such 
a wide application. Whatever the merits of the question may be 
upon theory an extension of the doctrine beyond the lex domicilii 
(lex patri({!) has appeared impracticable. Nothing but clear and 
controlling authority can be deemed sufficient to establish renvoi 
as a general rule of the English law. If In the G:oods of Lacroi!': 
and In re Baines represent the English law the validity of a con-
tract entered into in Italy by two Frenchmen who are domiciled 
in Italy must be determined by the English courts according to the 
territorial law of France, since the law of Italy in its totality, 
presumably applicable under the English rules of Private 
International Law, would so direct (Dicey), or, if West-
lake's view is correct, according to the territorial law of 
England (lex fori), inasmuch as there is disagreement be-
tween the English and Italian rules governing the Con-
flict of Laws with respect to contracts. The moment it is a 
recognized principle that the le!': loci, as regards form, and the le!': 
rei sit({! refer to the foreign law a~ a whole, it becomes impossible 
to contend that the other rules of Private International Law have a 
different meaning. It is submitted that the general application of 
renvoi in the English law will require for its support stronger au-
thority than that afforded by In the Goods of Lacroix and In re 
Baines, the former an ex parte and the latter an unreported de-
cision.59 It may be said, indeed, that even in its application 
to the lex domicilii in the law of succession renvoi is not as yet an 
08Westlake, Private International Law (4th ed.) 25-40; Dicey, Conflict 
of Laws (2d eel.) 715-716; Piggott, Foreign Judgments (3d ed.) 11, pp. 
261-264 See also, Brown, 25 Law Quart. Rev. 148, 153; I Williams on 
Executors and Administrators (7th Am. ed.) 440 . 
.. See also Bate, Notes on Renvoi 9, 119-120; Sewell, 3 Darras 523; 
25 Law Quart. Rev. 91. 
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established part of the English law. In none of the cases relating 
to renvoi, with the exception of In re J oluzson, was the court aware 
of the problem. The equivocal meaning of the term "foreign law" 
misled both court and counsel, causing them to assume in each case 
that the lex fori referred to such law in its totality. The funda-
mental error underlying such an assumption has since that time 
been so clearly established by the leading jurists of the world, that, 
notwithstanding the great authority of Westlake and Dicey, it may 
be reasonably hoped that when the doctrine with all its conse-
quences is squarely presented to the higher English courts they 
will not hesitate to reject the decisions of the courts that have lent 
color to renvoi in the English law as unsound in theory and as 
opposed to the principle of territorial sovereignty-the basis of the 
whole Conflict of Laws. 
The courts of the United States, it would seem, have never been 
called upon to deal with the question of renvoi. Certain portions 
of the opinion in Harral v. Harral60 might create the belief that the 
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey regarded itself as 
sitting in France, but it is more than likely that in affirming the 
judgment of the lower court, which had made it perfectly clear that 
by the law of matrimonial domicile only the internal or territorial 
law of the foreign country was meant, it entered upon a discussion 
of the French rules of Private International Law merely for the 
purpose of showing that they agreed with American law. What-
ever the object of the discussion, as there was no disagreement be-
tween the French and American rules of Private International 
Law with regard to the point in issue, the doctrine of renvoi was 
not involved in the case. 
The renvoi doctrine is, therefore, no part of the Conflict of 
Laws of the United States. Its introduction into our law would 
be most unfortunate on account of the uncertainty and confusion 
to which it would give rise in the administration of justice and its 
demoralizing effect upon the future development of the Conflict of 
Laws.61 
ERNEST G. LoRENZEN. 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY. 
••(1884) 39 N. J. Eq. 279. 
01lt is desired to correct a printer's error in the first part of this article, 
published in the March number. On pages 200 and ZOI, in footnote 42, 
views are attributed to v. Bar which should have been credited to Kahn. 
The whole of footnote 42, with the exception of the first paragraph, 
should be considered a part of footnote 46, in which Kahn's views are 
discussed. 
